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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the effects of selective vs. comprehensive school systems on military 
test scores in mathematical, verbal and logical reasoning skills tests. We use data from the 
Finnish comprehensive school reform which replaced the old two-track school system with 
a uniform nine-year comprehensive school. The paper uses a differences-in-differences 
approach and exploits the fact that the reform was implemented gradually across the 
country during a six-year period. We find that the reform had a small positive effect on the 
verbal test scores, but no effect on the mean performance in the arithmetic or logical 
reasoning tests. However, the reform significantly improved scores on all tests for the 
students whose parents had only basic education. 
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1. Introduction 
International comparisons of student achievement, such as the OECD’s Programme for 
International  Student  Assessment  (PISA),  have  generated  a  growing  interest  in  the  effect  of  
school systems on student outcomes. According to these comparisons, the differences in 
average test results across countries with roughly equal school resources are very large. Also, 
the dispersion of test scores varies considerably across countries. 
One potential explanation for cross-country differences in the level and, in particular, the 
variance of achievement scores is the extent and timing of tracking, or ability grouping of 
students. For example, the OECD has repeatedly argued that variation in student performance 
tends to be higher in countries with early tracking policies (e.g. OECD, 2003). High variance 
of student achievement and its correlation with family background have been seen as 
problematic from the perspective of equality of opportunity. On the other hand, postponing 
tracking could lower the quality of teaching at least for the high-ability students. Implicit in 
this debate is an efficiency-equity trade-off: postponement of tracking could improve equality 
but might decrease the average achievement. 
The timing of tracking differs significantly between comprehensive and selective school 
systems. In the selective system, tracking students into different types of schools occurs early, 
and choices made as early as age ten largely determine later schooling options. In the 
comprehensive system, students often stay in the same schools until the end of secondary 
school.  
In this study we evaluate the effect of the Finnish comprehensive school reform on cognitive 
skills tests. Finland had a selective two-track school system until the 1970’s, when the school 
reform replaced the old two-track system with a uniform comprehensive school system that is 
similar  to  those  in  other  European  countries.  As  a  result  of  the  reform the  tracking  age  was  
postponed from age 10 to 15. The differences between the pre- and post-reform systems are 
similar to the cross-country differences in school systems in the OECD countries today. The 
effects of the Finnish reform are therefore informative for the current schooling policy debate. 
Previous studies such as Meghir and Palme (2005) as well as Pekkarinen et al. (2009) have 
shown that comprehensive school reforms did improve the equality of opportunity by 
decreasing the intergenerational correlation of earnings. However, the earnings effects 
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reported in previous studies could be due to peer effects, social networks, opening of new 
educational opportunities or direct impact on productive skills. 
Using previously unavailable data from the Finnish Defense Forces we can partially open the 
‘black box’ relating school systems to labor market outcomes. We use scores from cognitive 
skills tests taken at the beginning of mandatory military service. These data allow us to 
examine how the comprehensive school system affected arithmetic and verbal skills as well as 
logical reasoning ability. This is particularly important as recent research emphasizes the role 
of cognitive skills, rather than mere school attainment, as important determinant of individual 
earnings, the distribution of income and economic growth. (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008). 
Yet existing evidence on the impact of major school reforms on cognitive skills is still scarce.  
We  use  a  similar  differences-in-differences  approach  as  in  Pekkarinen  et  al.  (2009)  and  
exploit the fact that the school reform was implemented gradually across regions. However, 
we evaluate the effects of the school reform directly on the distribution of skills that the 
students are supposed to learn in school. Our results show that the reform had a small positive 
effect on verbal test scores, but little effect on the mean performance in the arithmetic or 
logical reasoning tests. However, the reform significantly improved the scores in all tests for 
students whose parents had only basic education or low income. At the same time, the reform 
had no negative effects on the test scores of students from more advantaged backgrounds. 
These results are qualitatively in line with the results in Pekkarinen et al. (2009) where it was 
shown that the comprehensive school reform had a substantial negative effect on the 
intergenerational income elasticity. However, we find that the effects on cognitive skills are 
far too small to fully explain the effects on income. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on the 
effects of school tracking and compare our approach to the previous studies. We then describe 
the content and the implementation of the Finnish comprehensive reform. The fourth section 
describes the data and the Finnish Army Basic Skills Test, the results of which we use as a 
dependent variable. We then move on to present the differences-in-differences and maximum 
likelihood estimation of the effect of the reform on test scores in section five and in the sixth 
section we discuss the results. The seventh section concludes. 
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2. Previous literature 
Economic theory provides somewhat ambiguous predictions on the effect of comprehensive 
versus selective school systems on student achievement. A comprehensive system, where the 
entire cohort is in the same class, increases heterogeneity in the classroom. This probably 
makes classes more difficult to teach and thereby may lower student achievement (Lazear, 
2001). However, any changes in the class composition may also affect student achievement 
due to peer effects. The effect on the mean achievement depends on whether good students 
are harmed by bad students more than bad students benefit from being around good students.1 
Even if the effect on the average student achievement is ambiguous, a comprehensive school 
system should  decrease  the  variance  of  test  scores.  This  is  due  both  to  a  more  homogenous  
curriculum and to less segregated peer groups. Furthermore, as early educational choices are 
more likely to be determined by family background (Brunello and Checchi, 2007), later 
tracking age in the comprehensive system may reduce the correlation between the test scores 
and the family background. 
The most convincing empirical evidence on the effects of ability tracking on test scores comes 
from a field experiment in Kenya where randomly selected schools implemented tracking and 
non-tracking policies. Duflo et al. (2011) show that tracking within schools seems to benefit 
all students. However, it is not clear whether these results can be generalized to developed 
countries where the student population is less heterogeneous. Furthermore, in selective 
systems students are typically not tracked within schools but to different types of schools, 
which necessarily implies that teacher quality and curriculum may vary considerably across 
the tracks. In addition, the debate on the relative advantages of different school systems is 
primarily concerned with tracking into different types of schools rather than tracking within 
schools. Hence, even a well-designed randomized experiment of tracking within schools is 
unlikely to settle the policy question of whether the entire school system should be selective 
or comprehensive. 
In developed countries, most of the existing evidence on the potential benefits of selective 
versus comprehensive system originates from cross-country comparisons. For example, 
Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) find that the variance in test scores in international student 
                                               
1In the Lazear (2001) model the peer effects cannot be distinguished from the curriculum effects. In his model 
ill-behaving students stop the teaching for the entire class. Hence, average student quality determines how much 
time the teacher can spend in teaching and how much material can be covered. 
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assessments is higher in countries where tracking takes place at an early age. At the same 
time, early tracking seems to have generally negative effects on mean performance. In 
contrast, Brunello and Checchi (2007) and Waldinger (2006), who use a similar cross-country 
approach, find no effects on the test score variance. These conflicting results from previous 
studies reflect, in part, the difficulties in analyzing the effects of school system based on 
cross-country data. While these studies try to control for variation due to other factors by 
controlling for early test scores (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006; Waldinger, 2006) or by 
using time variation in the tracking age (Brunello and Checchi, 2007), it is far from clear that 
all relevant cross-country differences are reliably accounted for. 
Analyzing changes in test scores when a country switches from a tracked to a comprehensive 
system appears to be a more promising approach to identify the effects of the school system 
on student achievement. Previous attempts to do this include Kerckhoff et al. (1996) and 
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005), both of whom study the effect of a gradual movement 
from a selective school system to a comprehensive system in England. However, as noted by 
Manning and Pischke (2006), the areas that first switched to the comprehensive system in 
England were on average poorer than the areas which retained the tracked system. It is 
therefore difficult to disentangle the effect of school systems from the regional differences 
using  common  data  sources  such  as  the  National  Child  Development  Survey,  that  only  
contain a single cohort.  
Relative to the earlier studies, the distinct advantage of the Finnish reform is the availability 
of panel data from several cohorts, which avoids the need to rely exclusively on cross-
sectional variation. The Finnish comprehensive school reform was implemented gradually 
region by region between 1972 and 1977. This gradual implementation allows us to control 
for regional variation and any time trends in student achievement using a difference-in-
differences approach, which avoids biases such as those discussed by Manning and Pischke. 
Furthermore, the data also include information on families, which makes it possible to 
estimate the effect of the reform using data on brothers who were placed into different school 
systems because they differed in age. 
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3. Comprehensive school reform2  
3.1 Background 
Finland introduced a wide-ranging comprehensive school reform in the 1970’s. Similar 
reforms had already taken place in Sweden in the 1950s and in Norway in the 1960s (Meghir 
and Palme, 2005; Aakvik et al. 2010). The Finnish comprehensive school reform abolished 
the old two-track school system and created a uniform nine-year comprehensive school. The 
main motivation of the reform was to provide equal educational opportunities to all students, 
irrespective of place of residence or social background.  
In the pre-reform system all students entered primary school (“kansakoulu”) at the age of 
seven.  After  four  years  in  the  primary  school,  at  age  11,  the  students  were  faced  with  the  
choice of applying to general secondary school (“oppikoulu”) or continuing in the primary 
school. Admissions to the general secondary school were based on an entrance examination, a 
teacher assessment and primary school grades. Those who were admitted to the general 
secondary school (52% of the cohort in 1970) continued first in the junior secondary schools 
for five years, and often went on to the upper secondary school for three additional years. At 
the  end  of  the  upper  secondary  school  the  students  took  the  matriculation  examination  that  
provided eligibility for university-level studies.  
Those who were not admitted or who did not apply to the general secondary school track 
continued in the primary school. The primary school lasted altogether eight years. The last 
two years of primary school concentrated on teaching vocational skills and were called 
continuation classes or “civic school”. After an amendment in 1963 municipalities could 
further extend these civic school courses by a year, thereby creating a nine-year primary 
school. The minimum school leaving age, regardless of the track, was sixteen, unless the 
student had already completed all required primary school courses. The pre-reform system is 
described schematically in the left-hand panel of Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1: SCHOOL SYSTEMS] 
 
 
                                               
2 This section draws on Pekkarinen et al. (2009). 
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3.2 Content of the comprehensive school reform 
The reform introduced a new curriculum and changed the structure of primary and secondary 
education. The new curriculum increased the academic content of education compared to the 
old primary school curriculum by increasing the share of mathematics and sciences. In 
addition, one foreign language became compulsory for all students. The new comprehensive 
school curriculum resembled the old general secondary school curriculum and exposed the 
pupils  who  in  the  absence  of  the  reform  would  have  stayed  in  the  primary  school,  to  a  
significantly more academic education.  
The  structure  of  the  post-reform  school  system  is  described  in  the  right-hand  panel  of  
Figure 1. The previous primary schools, civic schools and junior secondary schools were 
replaced by nine-year comprehensive schools. At the same time, the upper secondary school 
was separated from the junior secondary school into a distinct institution. After the reform, all 
pupils followed the same curriculum in the same establishments (comprehensive schools) up 
to age sixteen. After nine years in the new comprehensive school, students could choose 
between applying to upper secondary school or to vocational schools. Admission to both 
tracks was based solely on comprehensive school grades. 
Unlike comprehensive school reforms in many other European countries, the Finnish reform 
did not extend the length of compulsory schooling or change the minimum school leaving 
age, which had been sixteen ever since 1957. Although the pre-reform system obliged the 
municipalities to provide only eight years of primary school, analysis of quinquennial census 
data  reveals  that  by  the  time  of  the  comprehensive  school  reform  most  municipalities  were  
already offering a full nine years of primary school for pupils who did not go to junior 
secondary school. In 1975, when the reform had not yet reached the ninth grade, 92.6% of the 
fifteen-year-olds that would be in the ninth grade if they progressed at the typical speed were 
still in school. This fraction remained at 92.6% in 1980 when the reform had reached the ninth 
grade  in  all  but  the  last  reform  region.  In  1985,  well  after  the  reform  was  completely  
implemented, the fraction of those turning fifteen while still in school was only slightly 
higher, 93.9%. To us, these numbers suggest that the comprehensive school reform did not 
increase the actual minimum school leaving age. The effect of the reform can thus be 
interpreted as coming through changes in the curriculum and in the timing of tracking 
choices, which naturally also implies changes in peer groups. 
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3.3 The implementation of the comprehensive school reform 
The implementation of the reform was preceded by a process of planning that lasted for two 
decades. The first experimental comprehensive schools started their operation in 1967. In 
1968, the Parliament approved the School Systems Act (467/1968), according to which the 
two track school system would be gradually replaced by a nine-year comprehensive school 
system. The adoption of the new school system was to take place between 1972 and 1977. A 
regional implementation plan divided the country into six implementation regions and 
dictated when each region would implement the comprehensive school system. Regional 
school boards were created to oversee the transition process. The municipalities that were 
responsible for operating the school system could not select the reform date but were forced 
to follow the plan designed by the National Board of Education. 
In each region, pupils in the five lowest primary school grades started in the comprehensive 
school  during  the  fall  term  of  the  year  stated  in  the  implementation  plan.  After  that,  each  
incoming cohort of first graders started their schooling in the comprehensive school. The 
pupils who were already above the fifth grade in the year when the reform was implemented 
in their home region completed their schooling according to the pre-reform system. Thus, in 
each region it took approximately four years to fully complete the reform. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the reform spread through the Finnish municipalities during 1972 to 
1977. The municipalities in which the reform was implemented in 1972 were predominantly 
situated in the northernmost province of Lapland. In 1973, the reform was implemented in the 
north-eastern regions, in 1974 in the northwest, in 1975 in the south-east, in 1976 in the 
south-west, and finally, in 1977 in the capital region of Helsinki. 
[Figure 2: COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL REFORM MAP]  
The  comprehensive  school  reform  faced  intense  resistance.  The  most  common  argument  
against the reform was that abolishing tracking would reduce the quality of education. As a 
compromise, ability tracking was partially retained so that math and foreign languages were 
taught at different levels within the comprehensive school. This ability grouping was 
eventually abolished in 1985. 
A reform of this scale naturally implied important changes in teacher education and the 
internal organization of schools. In the old system primary school teachers were educated in 
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separate non-university institutions. Initially, these teachers continued to teach in the new 
comprehensive schools. Eventually, teacher education was moved into newly founded schools 
of education within universities. Over time the reform therefore led to an increase in the 
average duration and an improvement in the quality of teacher training. 
The  implementation  of  the  Finnish  comprehensive  school  reform  makes  it  in  many  ways  a  
promising natural experiment for evaluating the effects of tracking on student outcomes. A 
particularly useful setup was created by the regional implementation plan that dictated when 
each municipality moved into the comprehensive school system. This allows us to use a 
fixed-effects approach to control for the changes over time and any regional differences 
between the municipalities that were assigned to different implementation regions.  
Given that we use data from the very first cohorts that were affected by the reform, the effects 
are likely to be somewhat attenuated. For example, in the early years ability tracking was 
retained in certain subjects, most teachers still only had the shorter primary school teacher 
education, and the merging of separate schools into the same physical units probably caused 
disruptions in the organizational structure.  
 
4. Data 
A fundamental problem in assessing the effects of school reform on student performance is 
that students in separate school systems rarely participate in comparable tests. Sometimes it is 
possible to use nation-wide performance evaluations or international comparisons of student 
achievement. However, since most large-scale school reforms took place in 1960s and 1970s 
when testing was not as widespread as today, it is difficult to find tests administered to 
representative and reasonably large samples of students from both pre- and post-reform 
school systems.  
This paper uses the results from the Basic Skills test of the Finnish Army. Since military 
service is mandatory for men in Finland, almost the entire male cohort takes the test. The 
average age at time of testing is 20, so obviously factors other than the school system may 
also have had an effect on the test results. On the other hand, the longer-lasting outcomes of 
school systems are probably more interesting than the immediate effects on test results. In 
addition, the Basic Skills test is also a strong predictor of earnings and occupation later in life, 
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so  any  effect  of  school  system  on  the  test  scores  will  have  important  consequences  for  
lifetime earnings.3 
The Finnish Army Basic Skills test is designed to measure general abilities. The Army uses 
these test results in selecting conscripts to officer training. Unlike the Swedish and Norwegian 
military test score data, used for example by Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010) and by 
Lindqvist and Vestman (2011), the Finnish test score data are available in a disaggregated 
form. The test consists of three subcategories: verbal, arithmetic, and logical reasoning. Each 
subtest includes forty multiple choice questions. In the verbal reasoning subtest, the subject 
has  to  choose  synonyms or  antonyms of  given  words,  select  words  that  belong  to  the  same 
category as a given word, exclude words from a group of words, and identify similar 
relationships between word pairs. The arithmetic reasoning test asks the subject to complete 
number series, solve verbally expressed mathematical problems, compute simple arithmetic 
operations, and choose similar relationships between pairs of numbers. The logical reasoning 
test is a standard “culture free” intelligence test based on Raven’s progressive matrices and its 
results should therefore be less affected by pre-test schooling.4 On the other hand, both the 
verbal and arithmetic reasoning categories test skills that are primarily taught in school. 
The test was originally created in 1955 and re-designed in 1981. Exactly same test was used 
over the entire time span analyzed here. From 1982 onward, the test results are stored in the 
Army database that also includes personal identification numbers, making it possible to link 
the test results to information on test takers from other data registers. Our data include all 
conscripts who were born between 1962 and 1966 and who were found in the Army database, 
i.e., those who started their military service after January 1982. There is some selectivity in 
the data due to the fact that it is possible to enter military service as a volunteer before age 20. 
Thus  some  men  in  the  oldest  cohorts  served  before  the  Army  register  was  created.  We  
experimented with several solutions to this problem. For example, we limited the analysis to 
those who served in the army at age 20. We also restricted the data to men born between 1964 
and 1966, i.e., those that we can observe even if they volunteered for early service at age 18 
or 19. Since this made qualitatively little difference, we only report the results from using the 
full sample and simply control for age at test.5 
                                               
3 Uusitalo (1999) reports that recruits who scored one standard deviation higher in the Basic Skills tests earn on 
average 6% more than recruits with similar education and experience but lower test scores. 
4 The contents of the tests are described in detail in Tiihonen et al. (2005). 
5 Results based on restricted samples can be found in Appendix 3. 
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It is possible to be exempted from the military service due to religious or ethical conviction 
though in 1980s this was rare. More common reasons for being exempt from military service 
were severe health conditions, most often related to mental health problems. However, even 
these criteria were substantially stricter in the 1980s than today. A comparison of the number 
of observations by birth cohort in our data and the corresponding cohort size in the 1980 
population census reveals that our test score data contain information on 85.3 percent of the 
relevant male birth cohorts6.  This  corresponds  closely  to  the  reported  fraction  of  the  cohort  
that served in the military in the 1980s (Finnish Defense Command, 2000).  
Figure  3  plots  the  distribution  of  the  raw scores,  i.e.  the  number  of  correct  answers  in  each  
subtest. The distribution of the average score is plotted in the bottom right corner. These 
histograms clearly show that there is plenty of variation in the test scores; the raw scores are 
distributed over the whole range from zero to forty. Also, the distribution of the average 
scores, is symmetric and not very far from normal distribution. 
[Figure 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE TEST SCORES] 
Per our request, Statistics Finland linked the test scores to census data on the Finnish 
population.  The  Statistics  Finland  longitudinal  census  file  contains  data  on  the  entire  
population living in Finland in 1970, -75, -80, -85 and -90. From 1990 onwards information is 
available annually.  Finnish census data are based almost entirely on administrative registers.  
For example, information on the place of residence in each census year is based on the 
Population Register. In general, these register data are of very high quality. Only a few 
persons have any missing data, and the main reasons for not being included in the census data 
are residing abroad and death. Therefore practically all conscripts were found in the register 
data and our data does not suffer from attrition problems that often plague similar studies. 
Census data were used to gather information on the pupils’ date of birth and place of 
residence in 1970, -75 and -80, which jointly determine whether the individual attended a 
tracked or a comprehensive school. Statistics Finland does not release these data with a 
municipality-identifier, but per our request created an indicator classifying municipalities into 
six categories according to the year in which the comprehensive school reform was 
                                               
6Our data are collected from the Finnish Army database and contain no information on those who did not serve 
in the military. It is also clear that those dismissed from the army due to health and mental reasons differ in many 
ways from the rest of the population. However, a simple comparison of the number of observations per cohort 
and region in our data to the overall cohort size in each region indicates that the comprehensive school reform 
had no effect on the likelihood of serving in the military. 
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implemented in each. Except for those who moved between census years between two 
municipalities that implemented the reform at different years, it is possible to accurately 
determine which school system was in place when the students were at the relevant age. The 
movers  were  dropped  from  the  data  used  below,  resulting  in  a  reduction  of  the  sample  by  
10%.7 
The census data also include family codes that can be used to identify brother pairs and to 
gather information on parents’ education and earnings. To be more exact, these family codes 
are based on persons living in the same household, not necessarily biological family 
members. We use the family codes from the 1975 census, when the oldest men in the sample 
were thirteen years old and most likely still living at home.  
Table 1 reports the mean test scores by cohort and reform implementation region as 
deviations from overall sample means in standard deviation units. Implementation regions are 
defined by the year when the reform took place in the region. There are large differences 
across regions and a general increase in the test scores over time. These regional differences 
are correlated with the average parental education and income levels of the regions, reported 
in the last two rows of the table. An increase in test scores over time, generally known as the 
Flynn effect, has also been documented using the same data by Koivunen (2007) for a longer 
time period. However, this effect also reflects differences between cohorts other than those 
due to the school system.  
The shaded area of the table indicates the students who attended comprehensive school. Since 
these students are younger and are concentrated in the regions with below average test scores, 
it is obvious that a cross-section comparison of regions or a time-series comparison of 
subsequent cohorts would not produce reliable estimates for the effect of the comprehensive 
school reform. Similar tabulations are shown for the three subtests in Appendix 1. 
[Table 1: MEAN SCORE BY COHORT & REGION] 
 
  
                                               
7 As a robustness check we included the movers and determined the reform year based on the place of residence 
in the 1975 census. This made practically no difference for the results. 
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5. Estimation methods 
Our goal is to estimate the causal effect of the school regime on the Army test scores. That is, 
to determine how an average student, or a student with certain characteristics, would have 
fared, had she or he been assigned to the reformed comprehensive system instead of the 
previous selective early tracking system. A fixed effects approach is used to control for 
regional differences as well as general trends over time. The effect of the comprehensive 
school reform is identified because the timing of the reform differs across regions. 
Most of the estimates are based on the following regression model: 
iitijiitiji CADDy ???? ?????????? )()()()(   (1) 
where yi is the army test score of individual i, attending school in region j and belonging to 
cohort t. Dj and Dt are region and cohort specific dummies and ?? is the age at test. Cj(i)t(i) is 
an indicator, varying across cohorts and regions, that pupil i attended comprehensive school. 
The parameter of interest in (1) is ?. The identifying assumption is that the comprehensive 
school indicator, Cj(i)t(i), is uncorrelated with the error term conditional on the other regressors. 
This assumption, and the fact that Dj and Dt enter (1) additively, reflect the basic differences-
in-differences  assumptions.  Note,  in  particular,  that  we  make  no  assumptions  regarding  the  
similarity of the regions where the reform took place early to those where reform took place 
later, nor do we claim that reform dates were randomly assigned. The parameter? ? is an 
unbiased estimate of the average causal effect of comprehensive schooling, if the timing of 
the reform is uncorrelated with other region-specific changes in student outcomes.  
It is important to notice that regression (1) controls for the regional differences with six 
implementation region dummies but not for the full set of more than five hundred municipal 
fixed effects. The main reason is that we have no access to the municipality codes due to data 
protection regulations. However, the only reason to include municipality dummies in 
regression (1) would be the concern that the reform took place earlier in non-randomly 
selected municipalities. But this is only a problem if the reform dummy is correlated with the 
municipality fixed effects. This correlation is fully absorbed by introducing the six 
implementation region fixed effects, since within these regions the implementation year does 
not vary across municipalities. 
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The fact that we only have 5 (cohorts) x 6 (regions) = 30 observations for identification 
purposes obviously has implications for statistical inference. We deal with this by clustering 
the standard errors at region level using the Moulton-procedure programmed for Stata by 
Angrist and Pischke (2009). Following Cameron, Miller, and Gelbach (2007), we also make a 
small sample correction for the standard errors by magnifying the residuals by )1/( ?GG , 
where G is the number of regions, and use critical values from a t-distribution with G-2 
degrees of freedom.8 To facilitate the interpretation of the statistical significance of the results 
with non-standard critical values, we report the 95% confidence intervals instead of standard 
errors of our regression coefficients in the tables. 
We also estimate (1) by interacting Cj(i)t(i) with parental education and income. These results 
are informative in evaluating whether the reform was particularly successful in improving the 
cognitive skills of students from disadvantaged family backgrounds relative to other students.  
Furthermore,  we  also  evaluate  the  effect  of  the  reform on  the  variance  of  the  test  scores.  A 
straightforward  approach  for  examining  this  is  to  model  simultaneously  the  effect  of  the  
reform on both the mean and the variance of the test scores. Assuming that the error term 
follows a normal distribution, the test scores will be distributed as  
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The subscripts in 2jt?  indicate that the variance in the test scores may vary across regions and 
cohorts and may therefore be affected by the reform. The model is parameterized by assuming 
that log-variance is an additive function of the region, cohort and reform dummies.  
                                               
8We were also concerned that serial correlation within regions could lead to a bias in the standard errors. 
However, calculating mean residuals by region and cohort from equation 1 and regressing these mean residuals 
on the lagged residuals indicates that the first order autocorrelations of the residuals in different test items are 
between -.09 and .11. These estimates are consistent with the null of no autocorrelation according to an 
autocorrelation test suggested by Wooldridge (2002), i.e. regressing the first differenced residuals on their 
lagged values and testing whether the resulting coefficient is equal to -.5. As a final check we also estimated the 
confidence intervals using a wild bootstrap-t procedure that retains the cluster structure in the data and, 
according to Monte Carlo results by Cameron et al. (2008), performs well even with only 6 clusters. In general, 
the width of the confidence intervals does not vary much across the different cluster correction procedures, nor 
are the cluster corrected standard errors very different from the OLS standard errors once cohort and region fixed 
effects are included in the model. We report alternative estimates of confidence intervals of key parameters in 
Appendix 2, but our main conclusion is that, given the lack of significant autocorrelation in the data, the choice 
of cluster correction method is not very important. This finding is consistent with the Monte Carlo experiments 
in Bertrand et al. (2004). 
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The log-likelihood function of the normal – heteroskedastic model is  
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where ? measures the effect of the reform on the mean score and ? its effect on the variance. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Average effects 
The baseline results are reported in Table 2. To facilitate the quantitative interpretation of the 
results, the test scores are converted into standard deviation units. Column (1) simply 
regresses the average test score on the comprehensive school dummy, and shows that those 
who attended comprehensive school scored on average 0.095 standard deviations lower in the 
Army test. However, the results in column (2) reveal that this negative correlation reflects the 
fact that regions with on-average lower test scores implemented the reform first. When full 
sets of birth cohort and region dummies are included in the regression, this negative 
correlation is removed and we fail to find any significant effect of comprehensive school on 
average test scores. 
The causal interpretation of the result in column (2) of table 2 relies on the standard 
difference-in-differences assumption that the changes in test scores in the reform regions 
would have been similar to the changes in the control regions in the absence of the reform. 
Given that the panel spans several periods, this assumption can be relaxed somewhat by 
adding  region-specific  linear  trends  in  test  scores  as  we  do  in  column (3).  The  effect  of  the  
reform is now positive and close to being statistically significant at 5% level but very small at 
0.025 standard deviation units. 
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Column (4) adds family fixed effects to the equation, thus identifying the effect of the reform 
from the differences between brothers that attended different school systems. The estimates 
become imprecise but are still very close to those reported in column (3). Interestingly, adding 
family fixed effects also reverses the positive trend in the test scores, indicating that the birth 
order effect on the test scores is larger than the difference across the birth cohorts.9 
[Table 2: BASIC RESULTS]  
Table  3  examines  the  effect  of  the  school  reform  on  different  tests  in  turn.  Column  (1)  
regresses each test score separately on the region and cohort dummies and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the person attended a comprehensive school. Column (2) again adds 
separate region-specific linear trends and column (3) controls for the family fixed effects. For 
brevity, only the coefficients of the comprehensive school dummy are reported in each 
column. The comprehensive school reform had no significant effects on either math or logical 
reasoning tests. The effect on the verbal ability test is positive and significant if regional 
trends are included in the model. The size of the effect on verbal test scores ranges between 
0.023 and 0.043 standard deviation units. Family fixed effect estimates tend to be much less 
precise than the estimates that exploit between-family variation, and are therefore never 
significantly different from zero or significantly different from the point estimates reported in 
columns (1) and (2). 
The finding that the comprehensive school reform had its largest effects on the verbal test was 
perhaps to be expected. After all, verbal skills are learned in schools, and hence the changes 
in school system may have effects on these skills. If indeed the logical reasoning test truly 
measures innate reasoning abilities, pre-test schooling should have little or no effect on the 
test. Finally, the changes in the mathematics teaching resulting from the reform were perhaps 
not as significant. As noted above, the ability grouping was retained in mathematics and, as a 
result, math classes continued to be taught at three different ability levels after the reform. 
 [Table 3: EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT TEST ITEMS] 
Table 4 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates measuring the effects of the reform on 
both the mean and the log-variance of the test scores. These equations are estimated 
separately for each test. All equations include cohort and region effects, regional trends and 
                                               
9 The birth order effect was also found in a Norwegian study of the Army test scores (Kristenssen and Bjerkdal, 
2007). 
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age-at-test  dummies  on  both  the  mean  and  the  variance,  but  only  the  effects  of  the  
comprehensive school reform are reported. The maximum-likelihood method produces very 
similar estimates for the effect of the reform on the mean scores as the linear regression model 
used in tables 2 and 3. The effects on means are significant only for the verbal test. The 
effects on the variance of the test scores are small but generally negative. In the math test the 
effect is close to zero. In the verbal and logical reasoning test the reform reduced the variance 
about 2.5 percent. None of these effects, however, are statistically significant. 
[Table 4: EFFECTS ON MEAN AND VARIANCE] 
As  shown  in  tables  2  and  3,  the  estimated  effect  of  the  reform  on  test  scores  is  somewhat  
sensitive to the inclusion of region-specific linear trends. This raises a concern that the 
standard differences-in-differences specification may fail to separate out pre-existing trends 
from dynamic  policy  responses,  as  pointed  out  by  Wolfers  (2006)  in  a  different  context.  To  
explore this possibility, we re-estimated equation (1) by adding dummies for years two and 
three prior to the reform and separate dummies for each of the five years after the reform, thus 
omitting the dummy for one year prior to the reform. This flexible specification should trace 
out any pre-reform trends and dynamic policy responses following the reform. The results are 
reported in table 5 and a visual representation for the average test scores is plotted in figure 4. 
There is little indication of any pre-reform trends. However, especially the verbal test scores, 
and to a lesser extent the average test scores, increase significantly in the first year after the 
reform and stay at a higher level or even grow in the years following the reform. These results 
suggest that the pattern found in tables 2 and 3 does not reflect pre-existing trends but rather 
stems from the true reform effect. 
[Table 5: THE EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL REFORM ALLOWING FOR LEADS & LAGS] 
[Figure 4: LEADS AND LAGS] 
 
6.2 Effects by parental background 
Tables 6A and 6B examine the effect of the comprehensive school reform on average test 
scores by family background. Column (1) in table 6A estimates regression models similar to 
those reported in column (1) of table 3 but adds an indicator of parents’ education and its 
interaction with the reform dummy. Parents are classified as being highly educated if at least 
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one parent has completed at least 12 years of education. In the pre-reform schooling system 
this generally refers to a situation where the parent attended the more academic track. In 
column (2), we add linear region-specific trends to the regression. Since the interest here is in 
the difference of the effect of the reform between recruits from high- and low-education 
families, we can control for regional trends in a more flexible way in these regressions. In 
column (3), we add interactions of birth cohorts and regional dummies thus controlling also 
for any non-linear regional trends. After adding these interactions the main effect of the 
reform on test scores is no longer identified, but the difference of effect between recruits from 
high and low educated families still is. Finally, in column (4), we further introduce the full 
interactions of parental education with cohort and implementation region fixed effects as well 
as with the test age dummies. 
According to table 6A, parental education has a clear effect on test scores. Men with highly 
educated parents score, on average, 0.275 standard deviations higher. The effect of the 
reform, now referring to the effect on men with less educated parents, is positive and larger 
than in table 2. However, the most remarkable result in table 6A is the negative and 
significant estimate for the interaction of parental education and comprehensive school 
reform.  According  to  the  results  the  reform  had  significantly  less  effect  on  men  with  more  
educated parents. This result is robust to including region-specific linear trends or full cohort 
region interactions although no longer significant once full interactions are introduced in 
column (4). The point estimates in table 6A indicate that the reform increased the test scores 
of men from low-education families by 0.031 – 0.047 standard deviation units and but little or 
no effect on men from high-education families. The results are qualitatively similar for 
individual tests (not reported in table) and again the effect is strongest in the case of verbal 
test scores where the reform increased the test scores of recruits from low educated families 
by 0.06 standard deviation units. This effect is sizeable, amounting to a quarter of the effect of 
parental education. 
In table 6B we repeat the same analysis now using parents’ income as the measure of family 
background. The parents’ income is measured by summing the annual taxable income of both 
parents, inflating the incomes to the 2002 price level and taking an average over the census 
years 1970, -75 and -80. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, parental earnings 
were normalized by subtracting the sample mean. This demeaning has no impact on the 
estimate of the interaction of the reform and parental earnings, but it makes it possible to 
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interpret  the  main  effect  of  the  reform in  table  6B as  the  effect  of  the  reform on  sons  from 
families with sample mean income. The results are qualitatively similar to those using 
parents’ education. Men with richer parents tend to have higher average scores and the 
interaction between the parents’ income and the reform dummy is negative in all models but 
column (4) where it is not statistically different from zero. 
[Tables 6A and 6B: EFFECTS BY FAMILY BACKGROUND] 
 
6.3 Magnitude of the effects 
The results presented above suggest that the comprehensive school reform increased verbal 
test scores by approximately 0.04 standard deviation units. This may seem like a small 
increase and it is therefore instructive to put our results into perspective by comparing them to 
the effect sizes found with other educational reforms. The closest comparisons are the various 
studies on the effect of tracking. Duflo et al. (2008) report that tracking students within 
schools in Kenya led to an average increase of test scores by 0.14 standard deviation units. 
Comparing different countries, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) find no effect of early school 
tracking on mean test scores. 
Jacob and Ludwig (2008) survey the effect sizes of various educational policies targeted at 
children from low income families in the US. The effects of these policies on test scores vary 
from a high of 0.22, related to a large reduction in class size, to effects as low as 0.03 of 
policies such as Teach for America. In addition, the policies surveyed by Jacob and Ludwig 
(2008) typically target much younger children, where we should expect to see larger effects. 
Hence, in the light of these results, the effects of the Finnish comprehensive school reform are 
small but not out of line with results from other education policies, especially given that the 
effects here are measured on average four years after the completion of comprehensive school 
while other studies tend to focus on more immediate outcomes. 
Perhaps the most interesting result reported above is the consistent positive effect of the 
reform on the test scores of recruits from low-education and low income families. As this 
implies a reduction in test score differences along socioeconomic lines, it is informative to 
compare the test score results to the earlier estimates of the effect of the comprehensive 
school reform on the intergenerational income elasticity.  
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Pekkarinen et al (2009) found that the Finnish comprehensive school reform decreased the 
elasticity of sons’ earnings with respect to their fathers’ earnings by as much as 0.066 log 
points. In this paper we report that the interaction of the parents’ earnings and the school 
reform is -0.036 in a comparable regression equation explaining the standardized test scores 
(Table 6B, Column 3). This estimate can be scaled using earlier results on the effect of Army 
test scores on earnings. For example, Uusitalo (1999) calculated that a one standard deviation 
increase  in  these  test  scores  implies  about  a  six  percent  increase  in  earnings  at  age  33.  
Hanushek and Wößmann (2008) found that a one standard deviation increase in the 
International Adult Literacy test score increases earnings by about nine percent in Finland. 
Multiplying -0.036 with either of these estimates indicates that the effect of school reform on 
test scores only explains less than half a percent of the observed 6.6 percent decline in 
intergenerational income elasticity. Even after allowing for generous corrections for 
measurement  errors  in  the  test  scores,  it  is  obvious  that  the  effect  of  the  school  reform  on  
measurable cognitive skills is not sufficient to explain its effect on the earnings distribution.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Persistent differences in average test scores across countries and over time have received 
plenty of attention in recent years. One often suggested explanation for these differences is 
the educational system. In particular, the tracking of pupils into different groups by ability and 
aspirations has been considered a potentially important factor. However, both the economic 
theory and the available empirical evidence remain inconclusive when it comes to the effects 
of tracking regimes on test scores. 
Here, we estimate the effect of the comprehensive school reform on the Finnish Army Basic 
Skills Test scores. Unlike previous literature that had to rely on cross-country comparisons or 
comparisons of regions within countries, here the effect of the comprehensive school reform 
on test scores is estimated using a difference-in-differences approach with single-country 
data. As such, the current study provides a more serious attempt at identifying the causal 
effect of school systems on test outcomes. 
On average, the reform had a small positive effect on the average verbal test scores and no 
significant positive or negative effect on the average arithmetic or logical reasoning test 
scores. Most interestingly, however, for all of these tests, the effect of the reform was positive 
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and significant in families where the parents had only basic education or low income, 
indicating a reduction in cognitive skills differences along socioeconomic lines.  
We argue that the changes in the distribution of skills are likely to be due to the more 
academic curriculum content and the change in peer groups that especially affected the 
students from less-advantaged families. As is typical with any evaluation of real-life policy 
interventions of this scale, we cannot disentangle the relative importance of these factors. 
However, most realistic changes in school tracking policies involve changes in both the 
teaching content and peer groups almost by definition. Hence reliable estimates of the overall 
causal effect of school tracking policies are highly relevant both in terms of the empirical 
study of educational policies as well as the current policy debate on school tracking. 
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Figure 1 Finnish school systems before and after the comprehensive school reform 
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Figure 2 The implementation of the comprehensive school reform across regions 1972-1977 
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Figure 3 Distribution of the test scores 
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Figure 4 The effect of the school reform on the test score average, estimation around the reform date 
 
 
Notes: The estimates in this graph represent a regression of the average test score on the cohort and implementation region 
dummies, age-at-test dummies, as well as separate dummies for the leads (up to 4 years after reform) and lags (up to 3 years 
before reform) of the reform implementation. The omitted category is “Reform-1”. The plotted points are the estimates on the 
lead and lag dummies, and 95% confidence intervals are shown around the point estimates. Standard errors are clustered at 
the implementation region level and the critical values from a t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom are used for inference. 
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Table 1 Standardized average test score by implementation region and birth cohort 
 
 Region (Year when comprehensive school reform was implemented) 
Birth cohort 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
1962 -0.21 -0.22 -0.16 -0.10 -0.01 0.19 -0.09 
 [2,634] [3,895] [5,693] [5,468] [5,668] [3,019] [26,377] 
1963 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.24 0.00 
 [2,896] [4,339] [6,346] [6,468] [6,496] [3,694] [30,239] 
1964 -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.23 -0.01 
 [2,865] [4,299] [6,238] [6,483] [6,723] [3,977] [30,585] 
1965 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.00 0.11 0.22 0.02 
 [2,715] [4,036] [5,995] [6,304] [6,290] [3,889] [29,229] 
1966 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.29 0.07 
 [2,185] [3,314] [5,117] [5,579] [5,550] [3,590] [25,335] 
Total -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.24 0.00 
 [13,295] [19,883] [29,389] [30,302] [30,727] [18,169] [141,765] 
Parental education 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.59 0.69 0.53 
Parental income 13,994 13,753 14,391 14,883 15,770 23,393 15,747 
Notes: Table reports the average scores in the Finnish Army Basic Skills test data by region and cohort. Regions are defined 
by the year when the comprehensive reform took place in the region (see Figure 2). The unweighted average of the three 
subtest scores (math, verbal and logical reasoning) is standardized so that the sample mean is zero and the standard deviation 
is one. The number of observations in each cell is reported in square brackets, below the mean score. The shaded areas 
indicate cohorts that were affected by the post-reform educational system. The last two rows of the table report the share of 
parents with at least 12 years of education and average income of parents from the 1970, -75 and -80 census data inflated to 
2002 euros using the consumer price index.  
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Table 2 The effect of the school reform on the test score average 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline Region & cohort Regional trends Family fixed 
effects  
Reformed school -0.095 0.010 0.025 0.023 
 [-0.260,0.070] [-0.017,0.038] [-0.009,0.058] [-0.023,0.069] 
Birth year 1963  0.027 0.034 -0.009 
  [0.001,0.053] [0.003,0.064] [-0.048,0.031] 
Birth year 1964  0.030 0.043 -0.020 
  [0.002,0.057] [0.000,0.086] [-0.074,0.033] 
Birth year 1965  0.061 0.082 -0.026 
  [0.031,0.092] [0.024,0.141] [-0.098,0.046] 
Birth year 1966  0.078 0.108 -0.046 
  [0.044,0.112] [0.032,0.183] [-0.138,0.047] 
Reform region 1973  -0.034 -0.034  
  [-0.066,-0.001] [-0.067,-0.001]  
Reform region 1974  0.043 0.045  
  [0.012,0.074] [0.014,0.077]  
Reform region 1975  0.081 0.087  
  [0.049,0.114] [0.053,0.120]  
Reform region 1976  0.193 0.201  
  [0.158,0.228] [0.165,0.238]  
Reform region1977  0.343 0.355  
  [0.302,0.383] [0.311,0.398]  
Lin. trend x region 
1973 
  -0.002 -0.017 
  [-0.026,0.022] [-0.046,0.012] 
Lin. trend x region 
1974 
  -0.008 0.002 
  [-0.031,0.015] [-0.027,0.030] 
Lin. trend x 
region1975 
  -0.019 -0.027 
  [-0.043,0.006] [-0.058,0.005] 
Lin. trend x region 
1976 
  -0.010 -0.023 
  [-0.035,0.014] [-0.054,0.009] 
Lin. trend x 
region1977 
  -0.016 -0.038 
  [-0.041,0.009] [-0.071,-0.004] 
Constant 4.557 4.343 4.315 3.904 
R-squared 0.067 0.074 0.074 0.048 
Observations 141,765 141,765 141,765 141,765 
Notes: Sample includes birth cohorts 1962-66. The dependent variable is the unweighted average of the three subtest scores 
(math, verbal and logical reasoning) scaled into standard deviation units. All regressions include 13 age-at-test-dummies. 
Column 2 adds birth cohort and implementation region fixed effects. Column 3 further adds region-specific linear trends. 
Column 4 is estimated with cohort fixed effects, regional trends, age-at-test dummies and family fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the implementation region level and the critical values from a t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom 
are used for inference. As non-standard critical values are used, the 95% confidence intervals are reported in parentheses 
below the point estimates. 
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Table 3 The effect of the school reform in different tests 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Region & cohort Regional trends Family fixed effects  
Math test 0.002 0.015 0.011 
 [-0.025,0.030] [-0.019,0.048] [-0.037,0.058] 
Verbal test 0.023 0.043 0.030 
 [-0.004,0.051] [0.009,0.077] [-0.018,0.078] 
Logical reasoning 0.006 0.011 0.027 
 [-0.022,0.033] [-0.023,0.045] [-0.025,0.078] 
Notes: Sample includes birth cohorts 1962-66, n=141,765. Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. Each 
subtest score is scaled into standard deviation units. The entries in the table represent the coefficients of a dummy variable 
indicating that the person attended the reformed comprehensive school. Column 1 includes cohort and implementation region 
fixed effects, and age-at-test dummies. Column 2 adds regional trends. Column 3 is estimated with cohort dummies, regional 
trends, age-at-test dummies and family fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the implementation region level and the 
critical values from a t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom are used for inference. The 95% confidence intervals are 
reported in parentheses below the point estimates. 
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Table 4 The effect of the school reform on the mean and the variance of the test scores 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Math 
test 
Verbal 
test 
Logical 
reasoning test 
Average score in 
all 3 tests 
OLS estimates     
Effect on the mean 0.015 0.043 0.011 0.025 
 [-0.019,0.048] [0.009,0.077] [-0.023,0.045] [-0.009,0.058] 
ML estimates     
Effect on the mean 0.015 0.042 0.013 0.025 
 [-0.019,0.049] [0.008,0.076] [-0.021,0.046] [-0.009,0.058] 
Effect on the log  -0.007 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 
Variance [-0.056,0.043] [-0.074,0.024] [-0.074,0.025] [-0.073,0.026] 
Notes: Sample includes birth cohorts 1962-66, n=141,765. The entries in the table represent the coefficients of a dummy 
variable indicating that the person attended the reformed comprehensive school. Each regression model includes cohort and 
implementation region fixed effects, regional trends, and age-at-test dummies. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in 
parentheses below the point estimates 
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Table 5 The effect of the school reform in different tests allowing for leads and lags 
 
 (1) 
Math 
test 
(2) 
Verbal 
test 
(3) 
Logical reasoning 
test 
(4) 
Average score in 
all 3 tests 
Reform - 3 years -0.003 -0.032 -0.034 -0.023 
 [-0.051,0.046] [-0.080,0.017] [-0.083,0.015] [-0.071,0.025] 
Reform - 2 years 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 [-0.027,0.040] [-0.028,0.039] [-0.035,0.032] [-0.028,0.038] 
Reform 0.016 0.055 0.020 0.032 
 [-0.021,0.053] [0.017,0.092] [-0.017,0.058] [-0.004,0.069] 
Reform + 1 year 0.012 0.054 0.044 0.038 
 [-0.041,0.064] [0.000,0.107] [-0.010,0.097] [-0.015,0.090] 
Reform + 2 years 0.003 0.070 0.045 0.040 
 [-0.069,0.075] [-0.002,0.143] [-0.028,0.118] [-0.032,0.112] 
Reform + 3 years 0.024 0.098 0.083 0.071 
 [-0.070,0.117] [0.004,0.193] [-0.012,0.177] [-0.022,0.165] 
Reform + 4 years 0.050 0.143 0.082 0.099 
 [-0.072,0.171] [0.020,0.265] [-0.041,0.205] [-0.023,0.220] 
Constant 3.120 2.856 4.579 4.305 
Observations 141,814 142,049 142,084 141,765 
Notes: Sample includes birth cohorts 1962-66. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. Rows report the estimated 
coefficients of dummies for 3 and 2 years prior to the reform, as well as, for the immediate effect of the reform and 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 years after the reform. The omitted category is reform year – 1. Each regression includes cohort and implementation 
region fixed effects, and age-at-test dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the implementation region level and the critical 
values from a t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom are used for inference. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in 
parentheses below the point estimates 
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Table 6A Effect of the school reform on average test score by parents’ education 
 
 (1) 
Cohort and region 
dummies 
(2) 
Region specific  
linear trends 
(3) 
Cohort x region 
interactions 
(4) 
Full interactions 
with parental 
education 
High educated 
parents 0.275 0.275 0.276 0.187 
 [0.248,0.303] [0.247,0.303] [0.248,0.304] [0.045,0.329] 
Reform 0.031 0.047   
 [-0.003,0.065] [0.007,0.086]   
Reform ×  -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 -0.031 
high educated 
parents 
[-0.070,-0.001] [-0.069,-0.000] [-0.071,-0.002] [-0.089,0.027] 
Constant 2.270 2.237 2.920 2.962 
Observations 126,977 126,977 126,977 126,977 
R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
 
Table 6B Effect of the school reform on average test score by parents’ income 
 
 (1) 
Cohort and region 
dummies 
(2) 
Region specific  
linear trends 
(3) 
Cohort x region 
interactions 
(4) 
Full interactions 
with parental 
income 
Parents’ income 0.325 0.324 0.327 0.246 
 [0.299,0.352] [0.298,0.351] [0.300,0.354] [0.109,0.384] 
Reform 0.014 0.029   
 [-0.015,0.042] [-0.006,0.064]   
Reform ×  -0.034 -0.033 -0.036 0.002 
parents’ income [-0.066,-0.002] [-0.065,0.000] [-0.069,-0.003] [-0.053,0.058] 
Constant 4.283 4.256 3.075 3.080 
Observations 126,891 126,891 
126,891 126,891 
R-squared 0.101 0.101 0.102 0.102 
Notes: Sample includes birth cohorts 1962-66. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. The dependent variable is 
the unweighted average of the three subtest scores (math, verbal and logical reasoning) scaled into standard deviation units. 
Parents’ education is a dummy variable indicating that at least one parent had a degree higher than compulsory education. 
Parents’ income is the log of average annual taxable income of parents from the 1970, -75 and -80 census data inflated to the 
2002 price level using the consumer price index. Parents’ income is measured as deviation from the mean log parents’ 
income is used so the reform effect can be interpreted as the effect at the mean income level. Column 1 includes cohort and 
implementation region fixed effects, and age-at-test dummies. Column 2 adds linear regional trends. Column 3 adds dummies 
for the interactions between birth cohort and implementation region. Column 4 further adds the interactions of parental 
education (or income) with 1) birth cohort dummies, 2) implementation region dummies and 3) age-at-test dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the implementation region level and the critical values from a t-distribution with 4 degrees of 
freedom are used for inference. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.  
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Appendix 1. Subsection scores  
 
Table A1: Subsection scores in the Army test by cohort and region 
Math score 
 
  Reform year    
Birth cohort 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
1962 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.09 0.01 0.15 -0.08 
1963 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.00 0.08 0.22 0.01 
1964 -0.12 -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.21 -0.01 
1965 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.01 
1966 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.26 0.07 
Total -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.21 0.00 
 
Verbal score 
 
  Reform year    
Birth cohort 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
1962 -0.18 -0.19 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.16 -0.08 
1963 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.19 0.00 
1964 -0.10 -0.14 -0.04 -0.00 0.05 0.19 -0.00 
1965 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.16 0.02 
1966 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.06 
Total -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.19 -0.00 
 
Logical reasoning score 
 
  Reform year    
Birth cohort 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
1962 -0.18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.08 -0.02 0.20 -0.08 
1963 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.24 -0.01 
1964 -0.08 -0.15 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.23 -0.00 
1965 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.02 
1966 -0.02 -0/04 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.30 0.08 
Total -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.24 -0.00 
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Appendix 2. Issues related to the standard errors of the estimates 
In the main parts of the paper we report standard errors based on the Moulton procedure and use for 
statistical inference a t-distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of clusters (6 
in our case). Clustering is done at the region, not at the region/cohort level. We also make a small 
sample adjustment suggested by Cameron, Miller and Gelbach (2008) inflating the residuals by
)1/( ?GG   . Since we use non-standard critical values we report condidence intervals instead of 
standard errors below the estimates.  
After  correcting  the  standard  errors  for  clustering,  the  remaining  concern  is  whether  the  cluster  
correction works given the small number of clusters and the potential serial correction of the errors. To 
assess the severity of the problem we followed the example of Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 
(2004) and calculated mean residuals from equation 1 by cohort and region. We then estimated 
autocorrelations by an OLS regression of mean residuals on the lagged mean residuals. The resulting 
estimates for first order autocorrelations were low: .03 for the average score, .11 for math, -.09 for 
verbal and .07 for the logical reasoning test. These estimates may naturally be downward biased due to 
the short time series. However, testing the null of no autocorrelation by regressing the first-differenced 
residuals on their lagged values, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002), indicates no significant first 
order autocorrelation. In any case, even somewhat larger autocorrelation coefficients (e.g. around .2) 
only lead to modest over-rejection rates in the Monte Carlo simulations of Bertrand et al. (2004), 
Table 2. 
For the sake of completeness we also calculated bootstrapped standard errors using the procedures 
described in Cameron et al. (2008). As the data are clustered by region, we used the block bootstrap 
and wild bootstrap that retain the cluster structure in the data and can be used with unequal cluster 
sizes. We did this bootstrapping the t-statistic, as recommended by Cameron et al (2008).  
In the tables below, we compare the confidence intervals obtained from the various estimation 
procedures  for  the  key  parameters  of  our  paper.  We  report  the  confidence  intervals  based  on  OLS,  
Stata cluster correction (with Stata default option that uses critical values from a t-distribution with G-
1 degrees of freedom), and Moulton correction (with the small sample correction and critical values 
from a t-distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom). Finally, we also report bootstrapped estimates with 
200 replications using the block bootstrap-t and the wild bootstrap-t.      
Our conclusion from these experiments is that the OLS confidence intervals are clearly too narrow in 
the first  column of  Table A2 when no fixed effects  are  included.  Other  methods produce results  that  
are qualitatively similar to each other, although the bootstrapped confidence intervals are somewhat 
wider. Once the fixed effects are included (Column 2), the confidence intervals produced by different 
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cluster correction procedures are quite similar, and even OLS confidence intervals appear to be quite 
accurate. Our interpretation is that this is mainly due to the low degree of serial correlation in the data. 
Confidence intervals based on the Moulton procedure appear to be the most conservative choice. 
 
Table A2: Confidence intervals for Table 2, effect of the reform on average score 
 Column 1 (b = -.095) Column 2 (b = .010) Column 3 (b = .025) 
Method Lower 95% 
CI 
Upper  95% 
CI 
Lower 95% 
CI 
Upper  95% 
CI 
Lower 95% 
CI 
Upper  95% 
CI 
OLS -.106 -.085 -.008 .028 .003 .046 
Cluster 
corrected -.258 .068 -.008 .028 
.010 .040 
Moulton -.260 .070 -.017 .038 -.009 .058 
Block 
bootsrap-t 
-.228 .136 -.017 .022 -.022 .089 
Wild 
bootsrap-t 
-.329 .138 -.007 .027 .011 .039 
 
For the other tables the conclusions from our experimentation are very similar. Confidence intervals 
based on the OLS standard errors are typically only slightly narrower than the confidence intervals 
based  on  the  parametric  cluster  corrections.  Also,  the  wild  bootstrap-t  advocated  by  Cameron  et  al.  
(2008) produces confidence intervals that are close to the confidence intervals based on the usual 
cluster correction methods. The only method producing qualitatively different results is the block 
bootstrap-t that in some cases generates extremely wide confidence intervals. This finding resembles 
closely the Monte Carlo results of Cameron et al. (p.423), who note that the block bootstrap severely 
under-rejects the null when there are only a few clusters. Their explanation is that in some bootstrap 
replications only one treatment or control region is sampled, and for these replications the treatment 
dummy produces a perfect fit and zero residuals. The resulting Wald statistics in these re-samples are 
very large, which results in severe under-rejection rates. Our findings are similar. Wald estimates in 
some resamples are very large and hence the bootstrap confidence intervals very wide.    
With the exception of the block bootstrap-t our experiments with bootstrapping indicate that the 
estimated confidence intervals are rather robust to the choice of cluster correction method. Again this 
is most likely due to the low degree of serial correlation in the data.    
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Table A3: Confidence intervals for Table 3, effect of the reform in the subtest scores 
Without regional trends (Column 1) 
Math (b = .002) Verbal (b = .023) Logical (b =.006) 
Method 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
OLS -.016 .020 .006 .041 -.012 .024 
Cluster -.011 .015 -.002 .049 -.021 .032 
Moulton -.025 .030 -.004 .051 -.022 .033 
Beta_block_t -.020 .019 -.071 .043 -.041 .027 
Beta_wild_t -.010 .015 -.007 .052 -.018 .053 
 
With regional trends (Column 2) 
Math (b = .015) Verbal (b = .043) Logical (b = .011) 
Method 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
OLS -0.007 .036 .021 .065 -.011 .033 
Cluster 0.002 .027 .024 .062 -.017 .039 
Moulton -0.019 .048 .009 .077 -.023 .045 
Beta_block_t -0.021 .027 .000 .077 -.137 .079 
Beta_wild_t 0.005 .024 .023 .064 -.028 .050 
 
Table A4: Confidence intervals for Table 6A, interaction of reform and parents’ education 
Column 1 (b = -.035) Column 2 (b = -.035) Column 3 (b = -.036) 
Method 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
OLS -.057 -.013 -.057 -.013 -.058 -.014 
Cluster -.072 .001 -.070 .000 -.073 .001 
Moulton -.070 -.001 -.070 .000 -.071 -.002 
Beta_block_t -.074 .097 -.068 .078 -.072 .094 
Beta_wild_t -.074 .004 -.071 .001 -.076 .004 
 
Table A5: Confidence intervals for Table 6B, interaction of reform and parents’ income 
Column 1 (b = -.034) Column 2 (b = -.033) Column 3 (b = -.036) 
Method 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 95% 
CI 
OLS -.054 -.013 -.053 -.012 -.057 -.015 
Cluster -.091 .024 -.090 .025 -.099 .026 
Moulton -.066 -.002 -.065 .000 -.069 -.003 
Beta_block_t -.081 .064 -.081 .062 -.093 .081 
Beta_wild_t -.097 .030 -.091 .025 -.103 .031 
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Appendix 3 Subsample results 
The data used in the main parts of this paper include all conscripts who were born between 1962 and 
1966 and who were found in the Army database.  The army test  scores are  in  the register  from 1982 
onwards.  As it  is  possible  to  enter  to  military service as  a  volunteer  before age 20,  some men in the 
oldest cohorts served before the Army register was created. This generates some selectivity in the data.  
In the final version of the paper we used the full sample and controlled for age at test. Controlling for 
age at test was done because age might have an independent effect on the test scores and because age 
of entering into the army is correlated with education. Volunteering into the army at age 19 is often 
convenient for high school graduates. Also education is one of the most common reasons for applying 
for deferment. In the data, the average test scores are higher for those who take the test before or after 
age 20 compared to those who take the test at age 20. 
However, controlling for age at test is potentially a problematic solution if age at test is correlated with 
education and the comprehensive school reform affects the length of education, thereby making also 
age at test an endogeneous variable. Controlling for an endogenous variable or limiting the sample 
based on such variable would generally lead into biased results.  
As  a  potential  solution  for  the  selectivity  problem we  restricted  the  data  to  men  born  between  1964  
and 1966, i.e. those whose test scores we can observe even if they volunteered for early service at age 
18 or 19. In order to balance the size of the treatment and the control groups in this limited sample the 
regions where the reform was implemented between 1972 and 1974 were also excluded from the 
analysis. The latter restriction also lessened the problem caused by unknown treatment status of 
persons who lived in different municipality in 1970 than in 1975. Such differences were relatively 
frequent because of migration and municipality mergers. The internal migration rates peaked in early 
1970’s and were about 25% higher in 1971-75 compared to 1976-80. In addition, altogether 71 of 518 
municipalities that had existed in 1970 merged with their neighbouring municipalities between 1971 
and 1975. Restructuring of local governments was much less intensive in late 1970s and hence the 
municipality codes that were used to determine the treatment status were more stable between 1975 
and 1980. 
In Tables A6, A7 and A8 we report the results from the restricted sample. The estimates are generally 
slightly larger than those presented in the main parts of the paper but qualitatively the restrictions 
made little difference. Eventually, these estimates were dropped from the version submitted for 
publication mainly because we calculated standard errors clustered by region and these restrictions 
would have resulted to even lower number of clusters.  
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Table A6: Reform effects using cohorts 1964-1966 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Math Verbal Logical 
Reasoning 
Average score 
     
Reform 0.0256 0.0788*** 0.0264 0.0479* 
 (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0247) 
Constant 2.548*** 3.238*** 4.109*** 3.434*** 
Observations 48,397 48,470 48,476 48,385 
Notes: In all columns the model includes a full set of dummy variables for region and cohort and a set of dummy 
variables for age on the test date. Regressions also control for linear regional trends in test scores. Standard 
errors are clustered at the region level. 
 
 
Table A7: Effect of the reform on average test score by parents’ education, cohorts 1964-1966 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Region-specific  
linear trends 
Cohort x region 
interactions 
Full interactions with 
parental education 
High ed. parents 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.0644 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0717) 
Reform 0.122***   
 (0.0286)   
Reform ×  -0.0713*** -0.0727*** 0.0156 
high ed. parents (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0353) 
Constant 3.083 3.164*** 3.104*** 
 
Observations 42,991 42,991 42,991 
 
Table A8: Effect of the reform on average test score by parents’ income, cohorts 1964-1966 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Region-specific  
linear trends 
Cohort x region 
interactions 
Full interactions with 
parental income 
Parental income 0.345*** 0.347*** 0.116* 
 (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0662) 
Reform 0.0734***   
 (0.0255)   
Reform ×  -0.0366* -0.0398* 0.0692* 
parental income  (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0354) 
Constant 3.543*** 3.249*** 3.245*** 
 
Observations 3.543*** 3.249*** 3.245*** 
Notes: Parents’ income is the average log income of parents from the 1970, -75 and -80 census data inflated to 
the 1980 price-level using the consumer price index. Deviation from the mean log parents’ income was used so 
that the effect of the reform can be interpreted as the effect at the mean income level. 
 
